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The town of Shaqlawa [          ] lies 400 kilometres
due north of Baghdad, fifty kilometres northeast of
Irbil, in the region of Kurdistan, Iraq. This article
concerns the oral histories of a graveyard, known as
the Sahaba Cemetery [                       ], on the outskirts
of Shaqlawa. 
Purportedly a burial ground for soldiers of the
Arab-Islamic armies who originally conquered the area
in the seventh century CE, this memorial space is the
subject of local traditions that portray it as both a target
for well-deserved defilement and a hallowed ground
with its own uniquely supernatural properties. The
Sahaba Cemetery’s status as an equivocal site – a fixed
point of reference around which divergent histories
have accumulated – renders it especially relevant to the
region’s past, present and future. These divergent
histories variously cast the cemetery as a supernaturally
safeguarded resting place of saintly conquerors, or as
a reminder of a regional, cultural exceptionalism pitted
against an intrusive force akin to today’s Islamic State.
In the generation following the death of
Mohammed (632 CE), his successors led the Arab-
Islamic armies eastward into the Sassanian empire and
westward into North Africa. Within three decades, the
earliest caliphs had extended their control from the
Muslim hub of western Arabia to encompass a vast
swathe of territory, stretching between present day
Tunisia and central Asia. According to conventional,
written histories, the mountainous region that includes
the town of Shaqlawa was subjugated by the caliph
Omar (alternatively transliterated as Umar, who ruled
from 634 to 644 CE), when the Kurdish tribes aligned
themselves with the Sassanian Persians. 
Shaqlawa, then part of a Median province, was
overrun by Arab-Islamic forces en route to the city and
plain of Shahrazor. The chain of valleys where
Shaqlawa lies nestled between Mount Safeen and the
Sork Ridge seem to have formed something of a corri-
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dor for successive waves of invasion and subjugation.
But the earliest written accounts of the Arab-Islamic
conquest were not set down until almost 200 years
after the fact. Moreover, lands like that of present-day
Kurdistan were peripheral, in terms of both geography
and historiography. Far removed from the decisive
battles at Qadisiya and Nihavand, far from the grand
capitals and centres of power like Ctesiphon, they
existed on the fluctuating frontier between the tottering
Byzantine and Sassanian empires, and consequently
do not figure prominently in the record of events. For
these reasons, beyond the general contours outlined
above, the written histories are murky or entirely silent
concerning the particulars of the Arab-Islamic expan-
sion into and through the vicinity of Shaqlawa.1
Sarah Bowen Savant has commented on the ways
in which local lore developed in this context: ‘As one
of the most dramatic events in human history, the
[Islamic] conquests gave rise to a creative mythology
that long afterward continued to inspire generations of
traditionists, who recalled the events of the conquests
as they negotiated their own loyalties to the Abbasid
state and its successors, to sect and family, and to
region, town, and neighborhood’.2 The present study
shows that, for lands once part of the wider Persian
hegemony, Savant’s incisive statement is equally true
for the period prior to the Abbasid Caliphate and
remains relevant to the ‘creative mythology’ of today.3
Oral traditions comprise a large part of what we
know concerning the past two millennia in the region
now called Iraqi Kurdistan. The manner in which such
traditions are conveyed, reconfigured, and incorpo-
rated into oral histories also has profound implications
for the present.4 Jan Vansina’s now classic distinction
between ‘oral tradition’ and ‘oral history’ is a useful
point of departure for understanding the kinds of
complex, personal testimonies connected to
Shaqlawa’s Sahaba Cemetery. Vansina defines the
product of oral tradition as ‘oral messages based on
previous oral messages, at least a generation old’, while
oral history entails ‘events and situations which are
contemporary, that is, which occurred during the life-
time of the informants. This differs from oral traditions
in that oral traditions are no longer contemporary.’5
In Shaqlawa, oral traditions rehearse the events and
circumstances of the initial Arab-Islamic conquest of
the region in the seventh century; oral histories convey
recent, personal encounters with the cemetery that the
conquest purportedly left in its wake. In practice,
however, the distinction is not always clear-cut.6
Although Vansina proposes that the two categories ‘are
very different with regard to the collection of sources as
well as with regard to their analysis’,7 the oral accounts
from Shaqlawa mingled ancient lore with more imme-
diate experience. For these informants, the conquest
that occurred more than thirteen centuries ago holds
an ineluctable relevance, and they perceive it with
varying degrees of distance and immediacy. As we will
see, the supernatural properties which tradition ascribes
to the local Sahaba Cemetery grant a particular
contemporaneity to a bygone event. This cemetery, a
dynamic, interpretive memorial, figures in oral tradi-
tions, oral histories and combinations of the two, for it
reflects and refracts the community’s present percep-
tions of itself, as well as individuals’ retellings of tradi-
tions in relation to their own experiences and
allegiances. 
In December 2014, the authors carried out a series
of individual and group interviews with adult male resi-
dents of Shaqlawa, a town of roughly 25,000 inhabi-
tants. The twelve informants were uniformly Kurdish
by ethnicity; were Muslim, at least nominally; and, with
the exception of one, were above the age of fifty.
Among these twelve, however, levels of education and
social class ranged from that of an illiterate shepherd
who had no formal schooling, to that of a mukhtar (a
local dignitary, akin to an elected mayor), who would
have completed secondary education. A more diverse
sampling of informants – one that includes women and
youths, for instance – might have yielded significantly
different responses. 
The demographic parameters of the present study
reflect, in part, the interviewers’ limited access to
members of the community other than older men. The
interviewers, both male and both outsiders in
Shaqlawa, did not gain access to private homes.
Cultural norms prevented interviews with women, yet
the interviewers might have eventually been able to
interview women if accompanied by their family
members or in groups, after spending more time in the
town.8 Such limitations meant that the authors, on the
advice of local historian Sarbaz Majid Omer, sought
their informants in public settings, beginning with the
kobunewey ewaran [                       ], or evening gath-
erings – a traditional context for communal story-
telling, in which men gather near the wall of the
mosque, public building or tea house for conversation.
Even individual interviews in or near such settings were
by nature public; in all of the interviews, additional
listeners were never far away. This factor granted the
present study, almost paradoxically, a wider reach with
potentially greater inhibitions. The men conveyed an
awareness that they were speaking for themselves and,
to a certain degree, to and for their town.
In spite of a population sample that is supposedly
relatively homogenous, the sheer variety of accounts
and perspectives these interviews ultimately obtained
is significant. The interviews elicited a wide array of
lore concerning the initial Arab-Islamic expansion into
the region and local repercussions; accounts ranged
from brief reports of traditions that scarcely constitute
a narrative, to personal anecdotes, to traditional tales.
The Sahaba Cemetery at the edge of town loomed
large in their collective memory. It served as a stimulus
and focal point for what they related. That acre dotted
with gravestones, the informants concurred, is a burial
site for those who died fighting to extend the dominion
and religion of the Rashidun Caliphate into the region.
Furthermore, the special status of those buried there
entails an exceptional, supernatural restriction on the
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The Sahaba Cemetery in Shaqlawa. Photo: Tyler Fisher, December 2014.
Gravestones in the Sahaba Cemtery. Photo: Tyler Fisher, December 2014.
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use of the site: no other cadavers can be interred in that
place, for the land will reject such bodies. In spite of a
perceived scarcity of suitable land for graves in the
vicinity of Shaqlawa, the Sahaba Cemetery remains
off-limits for fresh burials. 
This, in brief, is the oral tradition on which the
interviewees agreed, though they varied in their
personal experiences with the Sahaba Cemetery and
presented discrepancies in the degree to which they
subscribed to a belief in the supernatural sanction. The
variations in their accounts transpose personal and
collective preoccupations onto the cemetery, a locus
that serves to reify shifting patterns of allegiance. Iron-
ically, then, this is one patch of ground whose signifi-
cance has not been neatly conquered or controlled. 
Of stones and stories 
In contrast to traits normally associated with Muslim
cemeteries in the region, the gravestones of the Sahaba
Cemetery, in their present form, bear no apparent mark-
ings. No ornamental trees or flowers adorn the gravesite
of these anonymous dead; no one makes weekly visits
for the upkeep of the place, nor erects fences to delineate
plots of familial interest, because no one feels a direct
familial connection to it. There is, nevertheless, a sense
of communal caretaking in the mere fact of its preser-
vation. Set on a small hill among pasturelands, this
particular cemetery has been spared, thus far at least,
from encroaching development. From the site itself, one
can see recently constructed roads and related elements
of infrastructure, mining operations, housing, sports
facilities and two neighbouring, modern cemeteries that
show clear signs of recent use, including fresh graves.
But no such developments or interments intrude upon
the present perimeters of the Sahaba Cemetery.
The town of Shaqlawa viewed from the Sahaba Cemetery. Photo: Tyler Fisher, December 2014.
The mukhtar, Hassan Kadr Khdir. Photo: Tyler Fisher,
December 2014.
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Nevertheless, several informants conveyed first-
hand impressions that the dimensions of the cemetery
or the number of similar cemeteries had been reduced
during their lifetime. ‘Shaqlawa was full of such grave-
yards. There are only a few cemeteries left from the
golden days’, according to Abdul Kadr Aziz Taha, who
was born in Shaqlawa in 1932 and had a career
working on the town’s water and sewage systems.
‘There were several cemeteries’, sixty-two-year-old
Gazi Saeed Rashid agreed. The consensus among the
interviewees was that the Sahaba Cemetery today is a
diminished remnant of what was once a much more
numerous network of analogous burial sites. Hassan
Kadr Khdir, Shaqlawa’s mukhtar, said:
It is the only such cemetery left in Shaqlawa. There
used to be many more. Although there are scattered
single graves around Shaqlawa, this is the only col-
lective graveyard. I remember the cemetery being
larger when I was a child. It extended where the
paved road now runs. 
Kadr Hammad, an eighty-two-year-old shepherd,
emphasised how the sheer profusion of such graves has
given rise to a popular, unofficial name for the valleys
themselves, the Doli Ashaban [                  ] or Sahaba
Valleys: 
All the way from Shaqlawa to Ranya, there is a chain
of valleys called Sahaba Valleys, where there were
many graveyards of Sahaba who died when they
came to Kurdistan. [...] They were fighting the infi-
dels. 
But the wider Sahaba Cemetery and the other,
similar burial sites have since been effaced. They have
been effaced, moreover, without inciting any apparent
retribution from the supernatural forces that protect
the burial place. The hallowed ground could not or
simply has not resisted diminution over time. Of
course, it does not substantially matter if the witnesses’
recollections concerning a more extensive cemetery or
more abundant graveyards correspond to a veritable
obliteration of such sites, or if childhood impressions
only construe them as having been larger in retrospect.
What is important is that a perceived vulnerability to
obliteration calls into question the uniquely protective
powers ascribed to the site – its powers to ward off
inapposite bodies.
Regarding the cemetery’s purported powers, the
verb the informants used to denote the supernatural
rejection of new burials requires close attention. They
repeatedly employed two distinct verbs to express
what the sacred ground does to foreign bodies. The
more common of the two was fredan, fredadat, 
[                         ], which denotes rejecting, discarding
or throwing out. The other verb phrase was qbul nakat,
[ ], signifying that the earth ‘does not accept’
the intrusive body. These lexical choices are suffi-
ciently abstract and imprecise to allow a broad scope
for imaginative speculation on what form(s) that
rejection might take. The Sahaba Cemetery again
shows itself open to interpretation. One could
imagine the ground simply proving impervious to
inhumations, for instance, or one could imagine a
more active expulsion of the bodies, with projectile
possibilities. The indeterminate verbs for rejection or
non-acceptance can sustain a variety of imagined
deterrents and afflictions for an unwelcome body.
Nor, it seems, is this peculiar burial ground any
more tolerant of living occupants than it is of extrane-
ous corpses. Aziz Hassan Kadr, who was born in
Shaqlawa in 1943, related a tale from ‘a long time ago,
when [he] was young’: a man inadvertently built upon
a Sahaba gravesite. 
In the night, a Sahaba came to him in a dream and
told him that he had built his house and farm on a
Sahaba graveyard. In the morning, the man dug a
hole and found a Sahaba, his body intact but bereft
of an animating soul. 
The implication of this vision and excavation was
that the man must vacate the sacrosanct space of the
Sahaba’s gravesite. Still, as long as the introduction of
personal property into the Sahaba Cemetery did not
constitute a permanent installation, its protective
powers also, apparently, extended to safeguarding
personal effects. The mukhtar recalled that ‘in the old
days, people used to leave their belongings there when
they went hunting for days at a time, and no one would
disturb their belongings because they were in a holy
place’.
Aetiologies and anachronisms
Aside from any supernatural properties, the Sahaba
Cemetery’s explanatory power has preserved it from
being entirely effaced. In other words, its capacity to
lend persuasive force to explanations of past and
present circumstances has ensured its conservation as
both a physical space and a part of oral tradition. The
Sahaba Cemetery serves an aetiological function on
both a micro- and macro-level, on a narrowly local and
broadly national scale. On the most localised level, the
traditions that regard this as a burial ground of seventh
century Arab-Islamic warriors serve to explain the
presence and preservation of the graveyard on that
particular site. On the macro-level, the Sahaba Ceme-
tery serves to explain the rightness or legitimacy of the
Islamic conquest; its status as a sacrosanct space,
which supernaturally impedes additional burials,
stands as a justification of the presence of those Arab
bodies in lands beyond the Tigris. In this way, the
cemetery becomes a self-justifying, self-perpetuating
memorial, but not, as we will see, an uncontested
memorial.
The explanatory function of the Sahaba Cemetery
relies on several apparent anachronisms. In terms of
historicity, these anachronisms are problematic, yet
they are richly productive. The anachronisms include
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the identity of those who are buried in the cemetery,
the age of the gravestones and the site’s association
with Hasan Basri. First, strictly speaking, the Sahaba
or Ashab (the conventional transliterations of the
Arabic term ) were the ‘Companions of
the Prophet’, that is, Mohammed’s relatives, closest
associates and disciples. Over time, however, the defi-
nition of Sahaba broadened to include anyone who
had any contact with Mohammed during his lifetime.9
Among the Kurds of Shaqlawa, the application of the
term has clearly expanded even further. The local
usage goes beyond the orthodox acceptation to encom-
pass a very extensive group indeed: all members of the
conquering armies, some of whom qualified as Sahaba
sensu stricto, while many, of course, would never have
had contact with Mohammed. This is the first point of
anachronism for Shaqlawa’s Sahaba Cemetery – the
categorical inaccuracy that underlies the very identity
of the site. By assuming a closer association with
Mohammed, by suggesting a closer link to the origins
of Islam, the designation as a Sahaba cemetery entails
a heightened status for the space, a space accordingly
endowed with powers of self-preservation or, in effect,
deemed worthy of preservation by the community. 
Secondly, the vertically erect slabs of sandstone that
presently mark the purported graves cannot possibly
have endured the more than thirteen centuries that
have transpired since the conquest by the so-called
Sahaba. Relatively friable sedimentary rock of this kind
is particularly susceptible to weathering and other
forms of erosion. If this cluster of little monoliths in
Shaqlawa does, in fact, mark a burial ground for the
invading Arab-Islamic armies of the late seventh
century, local peoples must have replaced the memorial
stones at certain points over time. A more likely expla-
nation, however, is that the cemetery has no veritable
connection to the original Arab-Islamic conquests, but
is rather a vestige of some relatively minor, forgotten
skirmishes of more recent date, perhaps between the
Ottoman Turks and the Kurdish tribes of the region –
skirmishes that resulted in heavy casualties, hasty
burials and very little in the way of lasting socio-histor-
ical impact. The octogenarian Abdul Kadr Aziz Taha’s
summary concerning the Sahaba Cemetery includes a
telling bit of guesswork on this point: 
A long time ago, in the Ottoman Empire or before,
Muslim invaders came to Shaqlawa and were buried
there. You cannot bury anyone else there. That is
what we have always been told and believe.
For this informant, the Sahaba Cemetery is equally
likely to pertain to the time of the Ottomans as to the
first waves of Islamic expansion. A vague sense of
antiquity, of incursion by outsiders and general
credence are the important points in his conceptuali-
sation of the cemetery’s significance. 
One factor that might have influenced the preser-
vation of this particular space is its proximity to a small
cave called the Cave of Hasan Basri (referring to al-
Hasan al-Basri, 624-728 CE), located roughly 200
metres from the cemetery in a ravine. Among the infor-
mants in Shaqlawa, Aziz Hassan Kadr gave a précis of
the traditions concerning the cave in this way: 
Hasan Basri lived in the cave. He was the comman-
der of the Sahaba army. He used the cave to rest,
pray, worship. It has always been known as the Cave
of Hasan Basri. 
This is another anachronism that enhances the
status of the cemetery’s location and reinforces its
association with the conquest. The historical Hasan
Basri pertains to the generation of early Muslims called
al-Tabi’un, the Successors of the Sahaba. The Succes-
sors were, technically, two degrees removed from
Mohammed, after the true Companions. Although they
could not claim to have had direct contact with the
prophet of Islam, the closeness of their association
conferred a level of authority on these saint-like
figures, who were distinguished for their piety and
exemplary wisdom. 
Hasan Basri did serve with the conquering Arab
army in what is now Afghanistan and south-eastern
Iran, though his principal activities were fiscal admin-
istration and teaching.10 By that time, the lands around
Shaqlawa were under the caliphate, and there is no
historical record of Hasan Basri’s presence in the
region. It must, nevertheless, be granted that biograph-
ical accounts concerning Hasan Basri are largely
inconsistent and contradictory, so it is difficult to rule
out entirely any connection between the historical
personage and the cave that now bears his name. Once
again we find ample latitude in the oral tradition – a
willingness to take liberties with time and place in order
to augment the prestige of those associated with the
cemetery (the Sahaba, a legendary Hasan Basri) and
thereby to enrich the aetiological value of the place.
These anachronisms evince a measure of flexibility
and versatility in how the cemetery and its history are
construed and negotiated. The gravestones are, after
all, ambiguous, multivalent monuments. On the one
hand, they memorialise the resistance, valour and mili-
tary prowess of the local, pre-Islamic tribes; as one
informant said, with an evident sense of patriotism:
There were more Sahaba killed in the Khoshnaw
area [Knoshnaw is the name of the predominant
local tribe] than anywhere else in Kurdistan. We as
Khoshnaw people have killed more Sahaba than any
other Kurdish tribes anywhere. 
On the other hand, the gravestones are also monu-
ments to the justness or legitimacy of the conquest –
of the rightness of subjugating those tribes to the
conquerors’ rule and religion. These seemingly incon-
gruous commemorative functions that inhere in the
Sahaba Cemetery give rise to a variety of personal
reactions, including physical gestures of defiance, as
the Shaqlawa interviews attest. In spite of or because
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of its aetiological capacities and its anachronistic
underpinnings, the cemetery occupies a peculiarly
precarious status between sacred taboo and target for
profanation.
Taboos and transgressions
The informants’ responses reveal an exceptional
phenomenon in this regard: the Sahaba Cemetery is a
contested site that vacillates in its status between taboo
and target for defilement, between being a consecrated
tract of hallowed ground and an object of desecration.
A standard definition of ‘taboo’ (or tabu) in its anthro-
pological acceptation gives its meaning as ‘anything
that is forbidden under supernatural sanction to adher-
ents of a religion or members of a community’. Taboos
involve ‘rules of avoidance, prohibition, or restriction
[such as those] regarding a particular ritual state or
setting’.11 The definition fits the sense of interdiction
against interring new bodies in the Sahaba Cemetery,
particularly in the manner in which the threat of super-
natural exclusion from the space underwrites that
interdiction. But this cemetery’s taboo is also one that
is peculiarly vulnerable to violation. Rather than being
diametrically opposed points on a spectrum, there is a
thin line here between reverence and sacrilege, between
devout preservation and dismissive, derisive profana-
tion.
Describing acts that ranged from the innocuous to
the more deliberately sacrilegious, the informants
reported challenges to the sacrosanct space. The
Sahaba Cemetery, as previously noted, seems to have
been much more extensive in the past, at least in
Shaqlawa’s collective memory. Yet the rising tide of
erasure by nearby development has met no paranormal
resistance at the cemetery. Moreover, ‘children used to
play marbles in the cemetery’, Hassan Kadr Khdir, the
mukhtar, recalled. He especially associated disregard
or defiance of the gravesite with local youth, who pitted
their rebelliousness against the time-honoured space.
Mitigating a personal confession with the first person
plural, he admitted: ‘We used to spit on the cemetery
on our way to school’. Thus, the cemetery proved
susceptible to demolition, irreverent incursions, even
physical contamination.
Naturally, one might expect this testing of the taboo
to correlate with an increasing scepticism concerning
the sacred status of the site. But the informants
perceived no neat trend along such lines. Yes, they
pointed to a general waning of belief in the supernat-
ural sanctions, yet the impulse to preserve the Sahaba
Cemetery persists. ‘It is strange that we now have no
more space for cemeteries, and still no one uses that
hill for burial’, Gazi Saeed Rashid remarked. The
mukhtar concurred: ‘Even those who do not believe in
the stories are cautious about the area’. According to
informants’ estimations, rather than correlating with
degrees of scepticism, factors such as newcomers’
ignorance of the traditions, younger generations’ lack
of interest and, perhaps most importantly, shifting atti-
tudes towards the Sahaba, would render the cemetery
and its accompanying oral lore vulnerable in the future.
‘Of course it will change. Outsiders relocating here
have no connection to this city. People will forget the
cemetery’, the mukhtar continued. ‘The stories I tell
about the cemetery are from my father, who heard
them from his father. [...] But when I tell my own chil-
dren the stories of my father, they do not care about
such stories.’
As the interview with the mukhtar drew to a close,
Mohammed Hassan Ahmad, a local teacher who also
runs a stationery shop, offered his unsolicited
comments on the matter: 
The place should not be kept as sacred because those
people were invaders, enemies who tried to conquer
Kurdistan. If the government decided to destroy the
cemetery, it would not be a loss, nor would it attract
much opposition from the people. Younger people
especially would have no reaction against it, and
Shaqlawa is not very religious. People always call it
the Cemetery of the Invaders [dagirkaran, also
meaning ‘occupiers’                                    ], though some
people think they were liberators [meaning bearers
of a true, enlightened religion]. 
At the age of forty-three, this was the youngest of
the informants. His comments crystallised a point of
tension that emerged throughout the interviews. The
cemetery is only deserving of respect and preservation
if the putative Sahaba died in a rightful conquest of the
place. The taboo only wields power if the Arab-Islamic
hegemony is perceived as supernaturally endorsed.
Common ground: seeing parallels in the past
Greil Marcus has theorised concerning what he calls
‘history as disappearance’: 
It’s as if parts of history, because they don’t fit the
story a people wants to tell itself, can survive only as
haunts and fairy tales, accessible only as specters
and spooks. [...] History is a kind of legend, and we
do understand, or sense, buried stories, those haunts
and specters, without quite knowing how or why.12
The traditions concerning the Sahaba Cemetery in
Shaqlawa do not figure in any official, conventional
histories; they reflect a complex form of folk religiosity
that exists outside of institutionalised religion.13 Yet this
cemetery encapsulates a story that the people of
Shaqlawa simultaneously want and do not want to tell
themselves. The deeper, underlying narrative of the
Sahaba Cemetery is the story of Shaqlawa’s
contentious self-perception. Do the Kurds of Shaqlawa
hold a greater affinity (ethnic, religious or otherwise)
with the conquering Sahaba or with the tribes that
resisted those first waves of conquest? Like the ceme-
tery itself, is the land still occupied, in some sense, by
an alien power?
The informants, taken together, held these alter-
natives in tension, and differences are not merely
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generational. One can see this by comparing two
statements offered by octogenarians, previously
quoted in part. The shepherd Kadr Hammad said
that ‘there were many graveyards of Sahaba who died
when they came to Kurdistan. [...] They were fighting
the infidels. [...] They were retreating from the infi-
dels’; while Abdul Kadr Aziz Taha stated that ‘Muslim
invaders [ ] came to Shaqlawa and were
buried there’. The local peoples who resisted the
Sahaba, in Kadr Hammad’s version, are ‘infidels’ 
[           , or ‘enemies’], those outside the faith. In the
latter version, the indigenous resistance is only
implied, but the Arab-Islamic forces are clearly cate-
gorised as ‘invaders’. Abdul Kadr’s characterisation
of the Sahaba, as we have seen, is echoed in the views
of the teacher who is forty years his junior. 
Recent events inflect this depiction of the Sahaba
as foreign invaders. At the time of the interviews, the
Kurdish military was engaged in a desperate counter-
offensive to secure their border and drive Islamic State
forces back towards Mosul. Only months earlier, in
August 2014, the aspiring caliphate had seized villages
within thirty miles of Irbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdis-
tan. For most of the informants in Shaqlawa, points of
analogy between the Sahaba and the self-declared
Islamic State were readily apparent. Gazi Saeed Rashid
saw no difference between the two aggressors, past and
present: 
During Caliph Omar’s rule, his army came to invade
Kurdistan. [...] Anyone who refused to convert was
killed. He also killed many Christians. People who con-
verted to Islam were left alone. It is the same with IS.
The mukhtar drew a similar parallel between the
seventh century conquest and the current situation: 
IS is trying to conquer by force like the Sahaba first
did. When IS came, we first said, ‘This is a fight that
does not concern Kurds’. Most were content to let
them go attack Baghdad.’
But the Kurds suddenly found themselves
compelled to defend their territories, putting up a resis-
tance that re-enacted the purported genesis of the
Sahaba Cemetery. One informant pointed out a
distinction between the would-be invaders. Bakr
Osman, a retired policeman, commented:
One cannot say that they [the Sahaba] were the
same as IS. When the Sahaba came, there were no
Muslims around, but IS is fighting Muslims.
A group interview in Shaqlawa. Photo: Tyler Fisher, December 2014.
Kadr Hammad. Photo: Tyler Fisher, December 2014.
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The difference is one of degree, not of kind, in his
view. The Islamic State, which espouses an extremist
interpretation of Islam, is attacking their more moder-
ate co-religionists – the people who accepted or
succumbed to the religion of the earlier caliphate. 
‘Places are not fixed, static, preservable entities’,
one theorist of oral history has observed, ‘but more like
processes, [...] they are not bounded territories, but are
permeable – they are both shaped by and they shape
other parts of the world.’14 The Sahaba Cemetery, as
a semiotic space, retains an acute relevance for the
people of Shaqlawa. In it, they perceive and negotiate
their collective histories and identities, as in a micro-
cosm that embodies the wider territorial struggle for
ethnic and political autonomy. The informants’ readi-
ness to see analogies in groups across time also show
how the anachronisms inherent in the Sahaba Ceme-
tery traditions could have rapidly arisen from changing
circumstances. If today’s informants draw analogies
between the Islamic State and the seventh century
conquerors, a similar telescoping or conflation of
historical events might have mapped an Ottoman
incursion or even more recent conflicts onto the versa-
tile graveyard. 
Regarding his experience during the armed,
internecine conflicts between the Kurdistan Democra-
tic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in the
1990s, one informant, Aziz Hassan Kadr, related in
passing, ‘I was hiding in a cave and found some old
arrowheads and gathered them, which just confirms
that this has been a bloody place around Shaqlawa.’
The cluster of gravestones, like Aziz’s arrowheads,
encapsulate the history of conflict in this contested
region; as a memorial that offers chronological and
hermeneutic flexibility, the Sahaba Cemetery is a focal
point for the active interpretation of these conflicts.
Conclusion: living history
This article has referred to a region that is presently
designated Iraqi Kurdistan. At the time of this writing,
that is its official name, but the question of its status
as a semi-autonomous region or as an emerging nation
state in its own right remains a volatile one. A success-
ful transition from a stateless nation to a nation state
will depend, in part, on cultural allegiances that go
deeper than mere political decrees. Oral histories, like
those concerning the Shaqlawa Cemetery, might well
shape the course of history to come, for these unwrit-
ten stories express and condition the Kurds’ varying
degrees of affinity with or alienation from the Iraqi
Arab regions, culturally and politically. Oral history, in
this case, holds a striking, current relevance.
At the dawn of oral history’s emergence as a disci-
pline, John Marshall made the following prescient
prediction: ‘As oral study develops, it will provide rich
and living data [...]; the local (or regional) historian,
using oral history as his tool, can supply the sense of
place that is often missing.’15 More recently, Shelley
Trower has underscored how ‘oral history provides
unique insights into places’. She argues that ‘place and
oral history can both have active, interactive roles. Oral
history can help articulate how people experience
places, can change perceptions and understandings of
places’. But a local, place-specific focus need not
preclude an awareness of how that rich, living data may
have wider regional, even global resonance: ‘oral
history can develop in-depth knowledge of localities,
re-establishing the connection between the local and
oral in new ways and with new relevance in a global
context.’16 The potential these theorists and practition-
ers recognise in oral history’s applications plays out in
the highly localised Shaqlawa interviews and their
wider relevance to emerging Kurdish autonomy,
fraying ties with Baghdad and the Kurdish counter-
offensive against the Islamic State.
The oral histories and traditions concerning the
Sahaba Cemetery of Shaqlawa are no mere relics of an
all-but-forgotten past. They also provide a living
barometer, as it were, of current and historic senti-
ments among the conduits of these oral histories –
dynamic perspectives on how the local peoples, partic-
ularly Kurds, see themselves in relation to the Arab
ethnic groups of the south and west of Iraq. As we have
seen, current events inflect the informants’ interpreta-
tion of this space and of those buried there. Were those
who are now buried in the Sahaba Cemetery rightful
conquerors or wrongful intruders? Were they bearers
of divine truth or imperial militants, akin to those who
now menace the region in the ranks of the self-declared
Islamic State?
The answers are not, as the figurative idiom in
English would have it, written in stone. Rather, the
answers are negotiated in a field of brittle sandstone,
where the sacred and the profane exist in tension and
a community’s voices convey the events of a pre-liter-
ate era that still echo in today’s headlines.
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